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Voluntary Disclosure with Multiple Channels and
Investor Sophistication
ABSTRACT
This paper studies a voluntary disclosure model in which the manager can choose to dis-
close across two different disclosure channels: one processed by both informed and uninformed
investors, and one processed only by informed investors. Firm value is established in a compet-
itive equilibrium setting with risk averse investors and noisy information, based on participants’
expectations of firm value given the manager’s disclosure choice. Long-run firm value is estab-
lished through a rational expectations equilibrium. This model demonstrates a situation in which
a manager will disclose more information to informed investors than to uninformed investors in
equilibrium. Compared against a disclosure regime in which the manager only discloses publicly,
having both disclosure channels leads the manager to increase disclosure overall while decreasing
disclosure to uninformed investors. If the manager only discloses to informed investors, the overall
level of disclosure is identical, but expected stock price is maximized by having both channels.
Keywords: voluntary disclosure, disclosure channels, limited attention
Data availability: Simulation data are available from the author by request.
I. INTRODUCTION
The model detailed in this paper directly addresses a concern of Francis, Nanda, and Olsson
(2008): determining when managers use different channels (venues) of disclosure. This is an
important issue, as empirically managers disclose information across many different disclosure
channels, such as press releases, government filings, conference calls, websites, etc. By developing
a model where the manager can choose between two channels for disclosure or not releasing the
information at all, this study can build a theory for when a manager will choose one channel over
another for voluntary disclosure. The model is developed under a structure where some investors
are informed and others are not, as in Dye (1998).
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To demonstrate the impact of including multiple disclosure channels, equilibria using each
of the two channels in isolation are discussed. The channels considered here differ based on the
observability of the channels by different investor types where one channel available for disclo-
sure is quickly1 processed by all investors, while the second channel only quickly processed by
informed investors. This underlying structure is most closely related to the disclosure regime prior
to Reg FD (Regulation Fair Disclosure). Disclosing through multiple channels was a common
practice prior to Reg FD (Regulation Fair Disclosure), where companies could disclose publicly
as well as privately to certain individuals. Disclosing through multiple channels is also common
today, with many companies making disclosures through traditional channels such as SEC filings
and conference calls, as well as through newer channels such as websites and social media. As
early as 1995, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) maintained a policy on elec-
tronic disclosure (SEC, 1995). In 2000, the use of firm websites for disclosure was specifically
discussed (SEC, 2000), and in 2013 the SEC approved of the use of social media networks, such as
Twitter and Facebook, as a channel for firm disclosure (SEC, 2013). Thus, the SEC’s own policies
acknowledge that firms disclose through a variety of disclosure channels.
The model takes a basic structure under which the firm is either good or bad, i.e., a market
for lemons (Akerlof, 1970). No one in the model knows whether the firm is good or bad, but the
manager probabilistically receives a signal from the firm that follows the distribution of the firm’s
type. This signal could be thought of as a forecast about the potential value of a follow-on project,
or another indicator that is correlated with firm type but not correlated with firm value conditional
on knowing the firm type. This signal does not tell the manager the actual value of the firm, but it is
useful in determining whether the firm is good or bad. The manager then decides whether to truth-
fully disclose or to not disclose the information at all. In the main model, if the manager chooses
to disclose the information, the manager can then choose to disclose it through an easy-to-process
disclosure channel (easy channel) or a hard-to-process disclosure channel (hard channel)2. In the
1Quickly, in this context, is taken to mean costless processing within the time-frame between disclosure and
trading.
2The naming of these channels reflects the perspective of the uninformed investors. For instance, consider SEC
filings and firm websites. SEC filings are, on average, written in a difficult to read manner, with a Gunning Fog index
2
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225226 
short run, informed investors see all information that was disclosed, while uninformed investors
only see the information that was released via the easy channel. This is a strong manipulation of
disclosure channel understandability, akin to a pre-Reg FD world or to disclosure via a press re-
lease or webpage (easy channel) or burying the disclosure in a 10-K footnote (hard channel). Both
investor types are tasked with allocating their initial capital across the firm’s stock and an inelasti-
cally priced riskless asset. As in Dye (1998), if the manager receives information but chooses not
to disclose it through either channel, then the informed investors are aware that the information
exists and was withheld, but they do not know what the information is, whereas the uninformed
investors have no information. If the manager receives no information, the informed investors like-
wise know this, whereas the uninformed investors again have no information. A diagram of the
flow of information in this system is presented in Figure 1.
Under this framework, the manager does take advantage of this second channel when the
manager’s signal is in an intermediate range. Above this intermediate range the manager chooses
to disclose in the easy channel, and below this intermediate range the manager will choose to
withhold information even though the informed investors are aware of the withholding. When the
second channel is not present, the manager will withhold information whenever the signal falls
below a certain cutoff, which happens to fall in the intermediate range. This result agrees with the
primary result of Dye (1998). After deriving the expected management disclosure pattern, general
expressions for the competitive equilibrium price are obtained.
In the long-run, the manager’s disclosure pattern is unchanged. The uninformed investors,
however, are able to completely discern the informed investors’ information from the initial price,
and thus all investors have the same information in the long run. Overall, the long-run results
imply that managers can use multiple channels of disclosure to increase firm value in the short run
without affecting firm value in the long run.
above 18 (Li, 2008). Firm websites, on the other hand, are more likely to employ plain language. Thus, firm websites
should be easier for uninformed investors to process. From an informed investor’s perspective, SEC filings may be
easier to process, since the documents should have more consistent structures from firm to firm. However, this is
not relevant to the model, as it is assumed that informed investors can costlessly process any disclosure made by the
manager, regardless of channel.
3
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Through simulation, certain model characteristics are verified (to augment proofs), uncon-
ditional expected firm value is examined, and the dynamics of the equilibrium price and man-
agement actions are observed and discussed. The simulation finds that the two channel model
leads to the highest unconditional expected value of the firm, on average, and does so more than
95 percent of the time when compared against models with only an easy-to-process channel or a
hard-to-process channel. This demonstrates one reason why, ex ante, managers would use multiple
disclosure channels.
Related literature on informed investors in voluntary disclosure is discussed in the next
section. In Section III, the general structure of the model is described. Section IV derives the main
model under a competitive equilibrium and a rational expectations equilibrium and compares the
main model against models containing each disclosure channel in isolation. Section V uses sim-
ulation to examine implications of the model as well as the dynamics of the equilibrium. Section
VI concludes. Proofs not included inline are contained in the appendix.
II. REVIEW OF THEORY
Most of the research on voluntary disclosure focuses on the unraveling result (Grossman
and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986), altering one or
more of the six conditions for full disclosure. The most pertinent element of the unraveling result
to this study is the uniformity of investor response. Suijs (2007) found that violating this condition
while holding all others constant is sufficient to induce less than full disclosure. A specific variant
of violating uniform investor response that has been considered is varying investor sophistication.
Dye (1998) uses rational investors with probabilistic information acquisition, finding that managers
disclose more when investors have a higher probability of acquiring information. Fishman and
Hagerty (2003) demonstrates a model with two levels of sophistication, where one level is capable
of interpreting disclosures and the other only knows the disclosure happened.
The endogenous model in this study builds upon these models, particularly Dye (1998), by
having two separate channels of information: an easy-to-process disclosure channel (easy channel)
which can be quickly processed by all investors, and a hard-to-process disclosure channel (hard
4
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channel) which can only be quickly processed by informed investors. The hard channel can be pro-
cessed by all investors in the long run, however. Furthermore, the information that can be quickly
processed by the uninformed investors is not determined probabilistically, but is determined en-
dogenously by the manager.
This paper is also related to the stream of literature on limited investor attention. Limited
attention has been modeled in the disclosure literature to examine how investors might react to
different disclosure formats and rules (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), as well as earnings news (Hir-
shleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2011). Empirically, some extent of limited investor attention has been
documented by Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), showing that stock prices react more slowly to infor-
mation on Fridays. Likewise, Barber and Odean (2008) empirically demonstrate that investors are
more likely to purchase than sell stocks due to attention grabbing news, as investors holding the
stock are likely to be paying closer attention to firm news. The implementation of informed and
uninformed investors in this study can be interpreted as a strong use of limited attention, since the
uninformed investors do not observe any information in the hard channel. However, such a strong
use is needed to maintain tractability in the model.
III. MODEL STRUCTURE
The model takes place in a one period setting in which there are 3 types of players, one
manager working for one firm and two investor types. The main model considers a case with
two disclosure channels. The number and types of investors are taken to be exogenous, with 𝑁𝑈
uninformed investors and 𝑁𝐼 informed investors, 𝑁 investors in total. At the start of the first
period, the firm type is chosen to be either good or bad; the firm is good with probability 𝑝𝐺.
If the firm is good (bad), its expected value at period 1 will follow a normal distribution with
mean 𝜇𝐺 (𝜇𝐵) and variance 𝜎2. Variance is kept constant across firm types for parsimony in the
model results. A signal 𝑦 exists, such that the signal follows the true distribution of the firm;
thus, if the firm is good (bad), 𝑦 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇𝐺, 𝜎2) (𝑦 ∼ 𝑁(𝜇𝐵, 𝜎2)). It is assumed that the manager
receives the signal with some probability, 𝑝, as in Dye (1985), Jung and Kwon (1988), and Dye
(1998). If the manager receives the signal, then the manager can choose whether or not to release
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the signal. If the manager chooses to release the signal, the manager must do so truthfully, and
the manager will then choose which channel to release the signal through. Investors then receive
information based on their type and the channel chosen by the manager, determine their desired
amount of shares at each possible share price, and participate in one round of silent trading in order
to establish the firm’s stock price. Throughout this model it is assumed that the manager does not
and cannot manipulate the content of any disclosure, as in Dye (1985), Jung and Kwon (1988),
and Dye (1998). Consequently, this model assumes that the information contained in a disclosure
must be the same regardless of the manager’s disclosure channel choice. While this is an idealized
case, disclosure regulation, which could account for some variation in information content ex ante,
should be constant across channels—per SEC Release No. 33-7856 (US SEC, 2000), the disclosing
party is responsible for the accuracy of the disclosures regardless of the channel or medium through
which the statement is made.
Model setup
Disclosure channels
By allowing for multiple channels, voluntary disclosures can, at the manager’s discretion,
have different costs of access for investors. The main model in this paper implements this by having
two channels for disclosure, an easy channel and a hard channel. If the two investor groups have
a different ability to process disclosures among these two channels, then the manager could poten-
tially use this structure for personal gain when compared to a single disclosure channel model. In
practice, given that firm disclosures naturally vary in readability based on the channel of the dis-
closures, it is expected that disclosure channels will vary in the ease of processing across investor
types. For instance, annual reports tend to have low readability (Li, 2008), whereas disclosures via
social media are likely to be more readable. Based on the information that the investors receive, a
price per share of the firm, 𝑃0, will be determined. There are ?¯? shares available.
Investors
In the models, there are two types of investors. The first type of investor, informed in-
vestors, has sufficient processing capability to quickly process all information voluntarily released
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by the manager. Consequently, informed investors see all information in both channels before trad-
ing. Furthermore, informed investors are aware of whether the manager received a signal or not
(as in Dye (1998)).3 The second type of investor, uninformed investors, is able to quickly process
only the information disclosed through the easy channel. Uninformed investors, however, are not
capable of detecting or quickly processing the information in the hard channel, and the cost to
process the hard channel is assumed to be too high to attempt processing. All investors’ expected
utility is based on their expectation of the underlying value of the firm, the amount of the stock
they purchase, and the amount of the risk-free asset that they hold. The risk-free asset provides a
return plus 1 of 𝑅𝑓 and is perfectly elastic in terms of quantity. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
investors are risk averse, with a utility function following constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),
and in particular the investors have a utility function 𝑈(𝑥) = −𝑒−𝑎𝑥, where 𝑎 > 0 is the coefficient
of risk aversion.4 Lastly, it is assumed that there are 𝑁𝐼 > 0 informed investors and 𝑁𝑈 > 0
uninformed investors.
Manager
The model assumes the presence of just one firm with one manager. Inside the firm there is
private information in the form of a signal, 𝑦, related to the expected value of the firm at time 1. The
manager then receives this signal with some probability 𝑝. The signal 𝑦 is noisy and follows the
distribution of the firm’s value for the actual firm type, providing information about the firm type in
a Bayesian sense. If the firm is good, firm value at time 1 (𝑃1) and 𝑦 will follow 𝑁(𝜇𝐺, 𝜎2); if the
firm is bad, 𝑃1 and 𝑦 will follow 𝑁(𝜇𝐵, 𝜎2). When the manager receives the signal, the manager
will decide whether or not to disclose the signal based on the signal’s value, the manager’s utility
function, and the expected interpretation and actions by other market participants. If the manager
chooses to disclose information, the manager must pick between the easy and hard channels to
disclose through. While the manager could disclose through both channels simultaneously, doing
3This assumption is required in order to induce partial disclosure, as otherwise the manager has no incentive to treat
the two types of investors differently. Without this assumption, informed investors would have no extra information
compared to uninformed investors when the managers does not disclose. Thus, in equilibrium, the manager would
ignore the hard channel.
4This form of utility is used as it allows for tractability when the information processes described in the next
section are normally distributed.
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so is equivalent to disclosing through only the easy channel in this setting, given the investors’
information acquisition process and that disclosing information is costless. The manager’s utility
is assumed to be risk neutral and linearly increasing in the initial stock price, 𝑃0, of the firm.5
IV. MAIN MODEL
Under the framework outlined above, a short run competitive equilibrium can be deter-
mined.
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for the model is the set of man-
ager actions and investor actions covering all possible states of nature; whether the manager
receives a signal and, if so, the value of the signal. The manager’s actions must lead to the highest
price 𝑃0 given the optimal actions of the investors, and the investors must maximize their expected
utility with respect to their own information sets. The uninformed investors’ information set in-
cludes whether or not a disclosure was made through the easy channel, and if so, what the signal
was. The informed investors’ information set includes whether or not the manager received a sig-
nal, whether or not the manager disclosed a signal through either channel, and if so, what the
value of the signal was. Information on all probabilities, distributions, risk aversion, number of
each investor type, and number of shares available is common knowledge to all participants.
This competitive equilibrium can be thought of as follows. Suppose that the manager un-
derstands the makeup of the market, and strategically discloses to maximize the outcome of a one
period auction in which all shares must be sold. Then, investors use the information they receive
(either the disclosure or the lack thereof), and participate in a silent auction in which the highest
price that clears all market shares is chosen. As such, the investors cannot obtain information
from the auction itself, as the moment any usable information is generated, i.e., the market clear-
ing price, the auction ends. A rational expectations equilibrium following the same structure is
considered in Section IV.
Initially, there are four states to consider: a signal is obtained by the manager and disclosed
5Risk neutral utility is chosen for tractability. Imposing a CARA utility function for the manager is not tractable
in this model.
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to all investors (Full Disclosure, 𝐹𝐷), a signal is obtained but is disclosed only to informed in-
vestors (Partial Disclosure, 𝑃𝐷), a signal is obtained and is not disclosed (Withholding, 𝑊 ), and
no signal is obtained (No Information, 𝑁𝐼). As in Dye (1998), the manager may have an incentive
not to disclose if the signal 𝑦 is too low. This causes the manager’s non-disclosure signal to not
be a credible sign of having no information, and investors will behave accordingly. If the manager
could credibly contract to disclose the signal at any value of 𝑦, non-disclosure could be a credible
signal that the manager did not receive a signal. Without such a contract, there may instead exist a
stable point 𝑐𝑊 at which the manager is indifferent between full disclosure and withholding when
𝑦 = 𝑐𝑊 . Existence of 𝑐𝑊 is equivalent to the manager having an incentive to not always fully
disclose under a model in which only the easy channel exists. Furthermore, there may be two
additional stable points: one where the manager is indifferent between partial disclosure and full
disclosure (when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝐹𝐷) and one where the manager is indifferent between partial disclosure
and withholding (when 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷). These two points, 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑐𝑃𝐷, will define the manager’s
incentives under equilibrium in this model.
To simplify the discussion of the equilibrium going forward, the parameter space consid-
ered will be restricted. The analysis will focus on the the parameter spaces such that under the
on-path competitive equilibrium, a high value of 𝑦 is indicative of a good firm and a low value
of 𝑦 is indicative of a bad firm. These equilibriums will be termed “non-degenerate.” While it is
possible for a low 𝑦 to be indicative of a bad firm if 𝜎𝐺 > 𝜎𝐵, the results for such equilibriums will
mirror the results for the non-degenerate equilibriums.
Definition 2. A non-degenerate competitive equilibrium for the competitive equilibrium as de-
scribed in Definition 1 is one such that there exists some 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 such that 𝑃0(𝑦) > 𝑃0(𝑦1)∀𝑦 >
𝑦1 and 𝑃0(𝑦) < 𝑃0(𝑦2)∀𝑦 < 𝑦2.
Essentially, a non-degenerate equilibrium requires investors to infer that a high value of the
signal is good and a low value of the signal is bad, though this need not be true for intermediate
values of 𝑦. Before deriving the equilibrium, an existence condition and uniqueness are discussed.
9
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Theorem 1 (Condition for existence of a non-degenerate competitive equilibrium). A non-degenerate
competitive equilibrium as described in Definitions 1 and 2 exists whenever the following condition
holds:
𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎𝑝𝐺 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This existence criterion is intuitive. Under full disclosure, while the expected value of the
firm is greater for high values of 𝑦, the variance of the outcome will also be higher. As the investors
are risk averse, they do not only care about the difference in the means, but also in the variance of
the outcome. The price is penalized by a function that is increasing in the risk aversion of investors
and the number of shares available per investor. As risk aversion increases, investors will decrease
their willingness to pay for a share of the firm as they will be less willing to take on the risk of
the asset. Likewise, as the variance of the unconditional firm type distribution increases, investors
will assess a greater penalty due to their risk aversion. As 𝑝𝐺 increases, the difference between the
expectation of 𝑃1 conditional on 𝑦 and the unconditional expectation of 𝑃1 decreases. Lastly, as
the number of shares in the market relative to the number of investors increases, the price of the
shares decrease as all shares must be traded in order to complete the market.
Under the existence criterion, any disclosure pattern by the manager is likely to be unique.
However, proving uniqueness under the structure of this model is elusive due to the lack of mono-
tonicity in the price under partial disclosure, 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷. Instead, uniqueness is tested in the simulation
in Section V. Based on the simulation, any competitive equilibrium under the condition of Theorem
1 appears to be unique.
Investors’ actions
Before solving for the manager or investor actions, the perceived probabilities of ending up
in a state must be defined.
10
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Lemma 1 (Conditional probabilities). When 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑐𝑃𝐷 exist and 𝑐𝐹𝐷 > 𝑐𝑃𝐷, the condi-
tional probability that each investor type 𝑖 ∈ {𝐼, 𝑈} perceives the firm is good in state 𝑠 ∈
{𝐹𝐷,𝑃𝐷,𝑊,𝑁𝐼} are given by:
𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 =
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝𝐺)𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐵) ,
𝑝𝐼,𝑊 =
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐵)
,
𝑝𝐼,𝑁𝐼 = 𝑝𝐺,
𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑁𝐼 =
𝑝𝐺 (𝑝Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝))
𝑝 (𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺) + (1− 𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐵)) + (1− 𝑝)
,
Where:
𝛽𝑥,𝑇 =
𝑥− 𝜇𝑇
𝜎
,
𝜑(𝑥) =
1√
2𝜋
𝑒−𝑥
2/2,
Φ(𝑥) =
1
2
(︁
1 + Erf
(︁
𝑥/
√
2
)︁)︁
,
Erf is the error function, given by Erf(𝑥) =
2√
𝜋
∫︁ 𝑥
0
𝑒−𝑡
2
𝑑𝑡.
Each of these probabilities follows directly from Bayes’ theorem using the underlying prob-
ability distributions of the two firm types as well as the information set known to each investor type
on each disclosure state. Given the above probabilities and that the firm value distributions under
each firm type (good and bad) are normal, the conditional distribution the firm follows under a
given investor-state pair (𝑖, 𝑠) is given by
𝑁
(︀
𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝑖,𝑠)𝜇𝐵, (2𝑝𝑖,𝑠2 − 2𝑝𝑖,𝑠 + 1)𝜎2
)︀
. (1)
For simplicity, assume that all investors have the same starting wealth 𝑊0 and the same
coefficient of risk aversion, 𝑎. The investors’ problem will be to determine the number of shares
to purchase, 𝑥𝑖, that maximizes their expected utility based on the information set they receive, 𝐼𝑖,
11
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where 𝑖 denotes the investor:
max
𝑥𝑖
E
[︁
𝑈(?˜?1,𝑖)
]︁
,
= max
𝑥𝑖
E
[︁
𝑈(𝑅𝑓𝑊0 + (𝑃1 −𝑅𝑓𝑃0)𝑥𝑖)|𝐼𝑖
]︁
.
As 𝑈 is exponential and 𝑃1 is conditionally normal, this is equivalent to:
max
𝑥𝑖
𝑎E
[︁
?˜?1,𝑖|𝐼𝑖
]︁
+
1
2
𝑎2V
[︁
?˜?1,𝑖|𝐼𝑖
]︁
,
= max
𝑥𝑖
𝑅𝑓𝑊0 −𝑅𝑓𝑃0𝑥𝑖 + E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁
𝑥𝑖 +
1
2
𝑎2𝑥𝑖
2V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁
,
⇒ 𝑥𝑖 =
E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁
−𝑅𝑓𝑃0
𝑎V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁ . (2)
Once investors’ behavior under a certain state is derived, the initial price can be determined
by aggregating the each 𝑥𝑖 up to the number of shares available, ?¯?. This allows for solving the
price, 𝑃0, that clears the market for the ?¯? shares.
Equilibrium
Now an expression for the basic behavior under each state can be derived. This follows
from summing equation (2) for each investor and setting the sum equal to ?¯?, the total number of
shares available. The resulting equation can then be solved to determine 𝑃0,𝑠. Likewise, given the
optimal strategy for investors to follow, the manager’s strategy can also be determined. Thus, the
equilibrium can be defined.
Theorem 2 (Competitive equilibrium). If the manager receives a signal, 𝑦, then the manager’s
optimal action is to withhold if 𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷, partially disclosure if 𝑐𝑃𝐷 ≤ 𝑦 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷, and fully disclose
if 𝑐𝐹𝐷 ≤ 𝑦. The point 𝑐𝐹𝐷 is the value of the signal at which an uninformed investors’ value of the
firm is identical between full disclosure and partial disclosure, while the point 𝑐𝑃𝐷 is the value of
the signal at which an informed investors’ value of the firm is identical between partial disclosure
and withholding. If the manager has no information, then the manager’s only action is to choose
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not to disclose.
Aggregate investor actions under each state 𝑠 ∈ {𝐹𝐷,𝑃𝐷,𝑊,𝑁𝐼} are summarized by
the attained price 𝑃0 and and the number of shares purchased by each investor, 𝑥𝑖,𝑠:
𝑃0,𝑠 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐼,𝑠𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐼,𝑠)𝜇𝐵
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑠+1)𝜎2 + 𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑠𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑠)𝜇𝐵
(2𝑝𝑈,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑠+1)𝜎2 − 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑠+1)𝜎2 +
𝑁𝑈
(2𝑝𝑈,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑠+1)𝜎2
]︁ ,
𝑥𝑖,𝑠 =
E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁
−𝑅𝑓𝑃0,𝑠
𝑎V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖
]︁ ,
where 𝑝𝑖,𝑠 is defined as in Lemma 1 above.
Proof. See Appendix C for the derivation of investors’ optimal actions and Appendix D for the
derivation of the optimal manager actions.
The manager will choose to take advantage of both channels that are available. For high
enough signals, the manager will disclose through the easy channel, informing all investors of the
signal’s value. For low values of the signal, the manager will withhold the signal. For intermediate
values of the signal, the manager will disclose through the hard channel, only informing the in-
formed investors of the signal’s value. The manager discloses differently due to being able to pool
with the no information state for uninformed investors, but not being able to do so for informed
investors. Instead, the manager provides extra information to informed investors to raise their per-
ception of the firm’s value. This result implies that the availability of multiple disclosure channels
affects the information environment of the market, as the two disclosure channels are used to dis-
close different information. Consequently, the existence of multiple disclosure channels may have
an impact on firm stock price formation.
To better understand the effect of having a second disclosure channel, a competitive equi-
librium under the same framework is derived when only one channel, the easy channel, is available
to the manager. Such a model is analogous to Dye (1998) in that it examines one channel of disclo-
sure that is visible to all investors along with investor sophistication. However, the model in Dye
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(1998) is under different assumptions: 1) this paper uses a trading model, and consequently in-
cludes a risk-free asset along with the risky asset of the firm; 2) the signal in Dye (1998) is the firm
value, rather than a random signal from the firm value’s distribution6; 3) the makeup of investors is
pre-determined, with 𝑁𝐼 informed investors and 𝑁𝑈 uninformed investors7; 4) firm value follows
a normal distribution as opposed to a general distribution with a weakly decreasing probability
density function (PDF) and investors are risk averse as opposed to risk neutral. These assump-
tions flow from the standard setup of a competitive equilibrium market pricing model (Grossman,
1976). Still, the base results of Dye (1998) continue to hold under this new framework. Corollary
2.1 presents the equilibrium of this easy channel only model.
Corollary 2.1 (Manager action under 1 channel: easy channel). If the manager is restricted to
have only the easy channel to disclose through, and the condition specified in Theorem 1 holds,
the manager’s optimal disclosure pattern still depends on if the manager receives a signal and
the value of the signal. If the manager receives a signal, there exists some point 𝑐′𝐹𝐷 such that the
manager will fully disclose when 𝑦 > 𝑐′𝐹𝐷. The manager will withhold the signal when 𝑦 < 𝑐
′
𝐹𝐷. If
the manager does not receive a signal, the manager will not disclose. Furthermore, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑐′𝐹𝐷 <
𝑐𝐹𝐷.
Proof. That 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑐′𝐹𝐷 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷 is a consequence of the ordering in Theorem 2. From Theorem 2 it
is known that 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷(𝑦) > 𝑃0,𝑊 (𝑦) at 𝑦 = 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷(𝑦) < 𝑃0,𝑊 (𝑦) at 𝑦𝑐𝑃𝐷. Since 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷(𝑦)
and 𝑃0,𝑊 (𝑦) are continuous, then 𝑓(𝑦) = 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷(𝑦)− 𝑃0,𝑊 (𝑦) is continuous and maps (𝑐𝑃𝐷, 𝑐𝐹𝐷)
to (𝑣1, 𝑣2) where 𝑣1 < 0 and 𝑣2 > 0. If 𝑓 evaluates to 0 for some point, then the manager would
be indifferent between full disclosure and withholding. By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there
exists some point 𝑐′𝐹𝐷 ∈ {𝑐𝑃𝐷, 𝑐𝐹𝐷} such that 𝑓(𝑐′𝐹𝐷) = 0, proving existence.
This result is identical in spirit to the equilibrium in Dye (1998), and this model allows the
6This difference is needed in order to maintain tractability. Under the Dye (1998) framework, introducing a second
disclosure channel leads to an intractable distribution of bids for uninformed investors. Likewise, under a standard
competitive equilibrium in which the signal is the firm value, the expected utility under any withholding case becomes
intractable as the distribution of expected firm values follow a distribution akin to a product of a normal PDF and
normal CDF weighted to integrate to 1.
7This assumption improves tractability. In particular, this assumption removes the need to sum across a binomial
distribution to get the expected investor reactions.
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management actions underlying the two channel model can be compared against a one channel
model that is consistent with prior literature. In particular, notice that since 𝑐′𝐹𝐷 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷, the
manager will choose to decrease disclosure through the easy channel when the manager has the
option of using a hard-to-process disclosure channel. Furthermore, the manager increases the
overall level of disclosure when having access to both channels, as 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑐′𝐹𝐷. This implies
the existence of potential market efficiencies and inefficiencies from managers having multiple
disclosure channels.
To further explore the consequences of having multiple disclosure channels, the case in
which only the hard channel exists is also examined. While this model is farther from reality,
comparing it against the two channel model shows the impact that allowing for public disclosure
through a channel similar to the easy channel. The manager’s disclosure under this setup is as
follows.
Corollary 2.2 (Manger action under 1 channel: hard channel). If the manager is restricted to have
only the hard channel to disclose through, and the condition specified in Theorem 1 holds, the
manager’s optimal disclosure pattern still depends on if the manager receives a signal and the
value of the signal. If the manager receives a signal, there exists some point 𝑐′𝑃𝐷 such that the
manager will fully disclose when 𝑦 > 𝑐′𝑃𝐷. The manager will withhold the signal when 𝑦 < 𝑐
′
𝑃𝐷.
If the manager does not receive a signal, the manager will not disclose. Furthermore, 𝑐′𝑃𝐷 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷.
Proof. First, note that the informed investors’ information set under this setup is identical to that
of the main model – partial disclosure and full disclosure lead to the same inference about firm
type given the same 𝑦 for these investors. Furthermore, note that the uninformed investors cannot
receive any information in this setting. As such, disclosure will only impact the informed investors.
The manager will be indifferent between disclosure and non-disclosure at 𝑐′𝑃𝐷 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷, as the
managers problem is the same as in determining 𝑐𝑃𝐷 in Theorem 2 (solution detailed in Appendix
D).
Interestingly, the absence of the easy channel does not affect the manager’s use of the hard
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channel, unlike in the case with only the easy channel. This is because the hard channel is sufficient
to mimic the same strategy for setting the information set of the informed investors by disclosing
through the hard channel over both the full disclosure and partial disclosure regions of the two
channel model. This disclosure strategy stemming from the lack of an easy channel does impact
the attained stock price though, as the uninformed investors will unconditionally discount the value
of the firm since they have no possibility to observe the signal of the ex post value of the firm. As
the price impact is not solvable, the impact of removing the easy channel will be discussed in
greater detail in the simulation in Section V. The primary result of the simulation is that removing
the easy channel almost always decreases unconditional expected firm value.
Long run implications
To further understand the dynamics of the investor and manager actions in the underlying
environment, this section considers a multi-period steady-state style equilibrium. In particular,
it considers an equilibrium in which investors not only consider the disclosure information they
receive, but also the stock price as determined in the first period, i.e., in the competitive equilibrium.
Such an equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium.
Definition 3 (Rational expectations equilibrium). A rational expectations equilibrium for the model
is the set of manager actions and investor actions covering all possible states of nature, namely
whether the manager receives a signal and, if so, the value of the signal. Furthermore, the man-
ager’s actions must lead to the highest price 𝑃0 given the optimal actions of the investors, and the
investors must maximize their expected utility with respect to their own information sets. The unin-
formed investors’ information set includes whether or not a disclosure was made through the easy
channel, and if so, what the signal was. The informed investors’ information set includes whether
or not the manager received a signal, whether or not the manager disclosed a signal through either
channel, and if so, what the value of the signal was. Information on all probabilities, distributions,
risk aversion, number of each investor type, and number of shares available is common knowledge
to all participants. Furthermore, the current price as determined by the investors’ trade is visi-
ble to all parties and is used to construct a law of motion 𝑓𝐼 and 𝑓𝑈 mapping the beliefs of each
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investor type from one state to the next.
Because the price is visible to all parties, it is possible that the investors may be able to infer
the other party’s information from the price. Because the uninformed investors’ information is a
subset of the informed investors’ information, the informed investors cannot gather any additional
information, but the uninformed investors can. For uninformed investors, if the price is a sufficient
statistic for the informed investors’ information, then it would be possible for the them to perfectly
determine the informed investors’ information. In such a case, the equilibrium is said to be fully-
revealing.
Theorem 3 (Fully revealing equilibrium). The equilibrium discussed in Theorem 2 is fully reveal-
ing in a rational expectations context whenever
𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2. (3)
Proof. See Appendix E for the derivation showing that the rational expectations equilibrium will
be fully revealing.
Given the above theorem, a rational expectations equilibrium will exist and will be fully-
revealing, so long as the condition in equation (3) holds. Note that this is the same condition as
for existence of a non-degenerate competitive equilibrium from Theorem 1. This means that after
observing the price that attains in the competitive equilibrium, all investors will act as though they
are informed.
Theorem 4 (Rational expectations equilibrium). When 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2, the law of motion 𝑓𝐼
is the function 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥, as informed investors’ beliefs are unchanged, while the law of motion 𝑓𝑈
maps 𝑃0,𝑠 to 𝑝𝐼,𝑠. Initially, investor actions under each state 𝑠 are defined by
𝑃0,𝑠 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐼,𝑠𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐼,𝑠)𝜇𝐵
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑠+1)𝜎2 + 𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑠𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑠)𝜇𝐵
(2𝑝𝑈,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑠+1)𝜎2 − 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑠+1)𝜎2 +
𝑁𝑈
(2𝑝𝑈,𝑠
2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑠+1)𝜎2
]︁ ,
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where 𝑝𝐼,𝑠 is defined as in Lemma 1. Factoring in the law of motion above and that the initial
equilibrium is fully revealing, investor actions under each state 𝑠 for any subsequent period 𝑘 are
given by:
𝑃𝑘,𝑠 =
1
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑝𝐼,𝑠𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝐼,𝑠)𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
(2𝑝𝐼,𝑠
2 − 2𝑝𝐼,𝑠 + 1)𝜎2
)︁
,
The manager’s optimal action set when receiving a signal is to disclose when 𝑦 > 𝑐𝑃𝐷, and
to withhold when 𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷. The manager is indifferent between disclosure and withholding when
𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷.
Proof. The investors’ action is identical to that of Theorem 2, except with 𝑁𝐼 = 𝑁 and 𝑁𝑈 = 0.
This is a direct consequence of all investors acting as though they are informed.
The manager’s action is simply to disclose only when it leads to a higher expected value
than withholding for informed investors. As the cutoff, 𝑐𝑃𝐷, is invariant to the number of informed
investors, it is the same as 𝑐𝑃𝐷 in the competitive equilibrium case. Since no investors will behave
as anything other than an informed investor, the manager need not consider other investor types.
This shows that the manager’s competitive equilibrium strategy and rational expectations
equilibrium strategy are compatible. This result allows the manager to obtain a maximum stock
price in both the first and latter periods. Furthermore, this result implies that the manager can
achieve a higher stock price in the short run without harming the stock price in the long run. Thus,
there is no direct agency issue in terms of harming firm value, but there is a potential expropriation
of wealth if the manager has incentives based on the period 1 (competitive equilibrium) stock price
rather than the long-run (rational expectations equilibrium) stock price.
V. MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
This section further examines the model through a numerical example and simulation. The
simulation is used to provide supplemental analysis for some of the proofs in the preceding section
and to examine comparative statics of the model.
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Numerical example
Parameter values for the numerical example are detailed in Table 1. Values for the numeri-
cal example are chosen to be representative of an easy to illustrate case – the numbers abide by the
condition of Theorem 1, and the numbers lead to slopes that are neither extremely close to 0 nor
extremely large around the cutoff points. The behavior of slopes of 𝑃0 on 𝑦 at cutoff points is par-
ticularly important in being able to see how the equilibrium is determined, though the equilibrium
holds equally well without it.
The method to obtain the manager’s optimal action is illustrated in two steps in Figure 2.
Panel A shows the first part of the manager’s optimization problem: Given that investors know that
the manager has an incentive to withhold information and that the manager has the option to use a
second channel which uninformed investors cannot quickly process, the manager must determine
the information to disclose through the easy channel. In Panel A, the crossing of the full disclosure
and partial disclosure lines indicates the value of the signal at which the manager is indifferent
between partial and full disclosure. In this example, that cutoff is at 0.8825 – between the mean
unconditional expected values of the good and bad firm types. Once this cutoff is determined,
the cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding can be determined, which is illustrated in
Panel B of Figure 2. In Panel B, the intersection of the two lines again indicates the point at
which the manager would be indifferent between partial disclosure and withholding. This occurs
at 0.3678. Note that while the graphs appear to converge on the left side, they are not quite equal –
withholding leads to a higher price for all cutoffs less than the optimal cutoff, though the two lines
limit to the same value.
In this numerical example, if the manager only had one channel available, a cutoff of 0.7535
would be optimal. Consistent with Corollary 2.1, the inclusion of a second channel leads to a
decrease in the information available through the easy channel. Likewise, the inclusion of a second
channel leads the manager to release more information to the market overall.
Figure 3 depicts how these disclosure choices impact the firm’s stock price. In Panel A,
the stock price under each of the three disclosure strategies (along with the no information case)
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are presented for each level of the signal 𝑦. The points of indifference discussed above, 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and
𝑐𝑃𝐷, are included as solid vertical lines. As the price determined by withholding is formed purely
based on expectations derived from the endogenously determined cutoffs, the price is constant with
respect to the value of the signal. On the far left, this constant value dominates the price that would
be obtained through any type of disclosure. For middle values of the signal, the price from partial
and full disclosure increases at a rapid rate. As the uninformed investors’ risk-adjusted expectation
of firm value is higher than that of the informed investors, partial disclosure leads to a higher overall
price in this region. On the right portion of the graph, the price from full disclosure dominates,
as the signal is sufficiently high enough to raise the uninformed investor’s risk-adjusted expected
value of the firm compared to the no disclosure case for them. In particular, when no disclosure
is visible to the uninformed investors, they endogenously determine a 38.5 percent chance that the
firm is good. Likewise, the rightmost cutoff occurs when full disclosure leads to a 38.5 percent
probability that the firm is good. This is lower than the unconditional probability that the firm is
good of 50 percent.
Simulation
In order to understand how changes in the model parameters affect stock price and dis-
closure behavior in the model, 10,000 iterations of a simulation of the model were run. Distribu-
tions for model parameters were chosen such that they always satisfy Theorem 1; the distributions
are presented in Table 1. Parameters were chosen to represent a wide variety of values and for
tractability. The probability of the manager acquiring the signal is allowed to vary from 0 to 1,
encompassing all possible values. The number of investors, 𝑁 , is fixed at 100 for simplicity in ap-
plying a distribution to the number of shares available, ?¯?, as the ratio of these quantities drives the
effect of ?¯?. ?¯? is allowed to vary between 50 and 100 shares, at integer values only. The number of
uninformed investors is allowed to vary across the entire range of integers from 1 to 𝑁 − 1, inclu-
sive, guaranteeing that there is at least one of each investor type. The coefficient of risk aversion,
𝑎, is allowed to vary between 0 and 1, as that level covers a large amount of empirically identified
risk aversion levels (see Table 1 of Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman (1993)). The percentage chance
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that the firm is good is chosen to be between 0 and 0.5 for tractability in the simulation. The prob-
ability that the firm is good heavily influences the slope of the stock price, 𝑃0, with respect to the
signal 𝑦, making the slopes at the indifference points between disclosure choices more similar as
𝑝𝐺 increases. As such, the numerical solver employed converges more efficiently when 𝑝𝐺 < 0.50.
The standard deviation, 𝜎 is bounded between 0.5 and 1, while 𝜇𝐺 is bounded between 1 and 3,
and 𝜇𝐵 is set to 0. These choices assure that the condition of Theorem 1 is fulfilled and allow 𝜇𝐺
to vary between 1 and 6 standard deviations above 𝜇𝐵.
Proof verification
The first verification focuses on existence and uniqueness. As expected given the proof
of existence, a solution is found for the main model simulation in all 10,000 iterations, as the
parameters conform to the condition in Theorem 1. For each of these 10,000 iterations, one unique
utility maximizing solution is found for the manager in terms of the disclosure cutoffs 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and
𝑐𝑃𝐷. This also holds true for both one channel models. This provides evidence that the equilibrium
described in Theorem 2 is unique.
The second verification, for Theorem 3, regards the monotonicity of 𝑃0 in 𝑦 over the partial
disclosure region. In the simulation, 𝑃0 is monotonic in 𝑦 in all 10,000 iterations, as the minimum
derivative of 𝑝0 with respect to 𝑦 over the partial disclosure region across all iterations is 2.39 ×
10−6. As such, this provides evidence that the value of 𝑃0 is always increasing in the value of
the signal throughout the partial disclosure range, so long as the existence condition is met. The
proved portion of Theorem 3, that 𝑃0 is monotonic in 𝑦 over the full disclosure region, is also
verified by the simulation. In all 10,000 iterations, the derivative of 𝑃0 with respect to 𝑦 is positive,
with a minimum derivative of 5.32× 10−6.
Results and statics
This section examines the outcomes of the simulation to draw conclusions on unconditional
expected stock prices and the amount of disclosure by managers.
When examining the levels of the unconditional expected stock price, it is observed that
the average price is highest with two channels, at 0.8093. With just the easy channel available, the
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average unconditional expected price is just 0.16 percent lower, while with just the hard channel
available the average unconditional expected price is 31.5 percent lower. Without any disclosure
possible, the average unconditional expected price is 56.2 percent lower than with both channels
available. As such, it appears that the easy channel is more valuable than the hard channel, as it
influences a greater number of investors beliefs about the firm’s value. Even so, the hard channel, in
isolation, does have a large impact on price by itself, but has a much lower impact when combined
with the easy channel.
Despite the relatively close unconditional expected stock prices from the two channel and
the easy channel only models, the two channel model leads to a higher unconditional expected
stock price over 96 percent of the time in the simulation (9,609 of 10,000 iterations). Compared to
the hard channel only model, both the two channel and easy channel only models lead to a higher
unconditional expected stock price in all but 16 iterations.
Regarding the amount of information disclosed, the two channel case led to less disclosure
in the easy channel in each iteration, compared to the easy channel only model, though more in-
formation was disclosed overall in each iteration. This is consistent with Corollary 2.1. Consistent
with Corollary 2.2, the amount of information disclosed under the hard channel only model was
the same as the amount of information disclosed under the two channel model.
In order to understand how the unconditional stock price and the disclosure pattern change
with respect to the various parameters of the model, the simulation is necessary, as statics for
this model are not analytically attainable.8 The simulation varies each parameter of the model to
understand the overall effects of each parameter.
Figure 4 illustrates how the unconditional expected stock price varies with each of 7 pa-
rameters. As expected, increasing the mean of the distribution of good firm value increases the
expected price, since that directly increases the investors expectation of firm value. Likewise, in-
creasing the standard deviation leads to a decrease in stock price, as the investors are risk averse.
8In particular, maximizing over the disclosure options leads to a maximization problem in which the main de-
terminant, 𝑦 is contained in both the PDF and CDF of the normal distribution, leading to a seemingly intractable
maximization problem.
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Increasing the probability the firm is good has two main effects. First, the firm is more likely to
be good, and thus the expected value of the firm will be higher. Second, increasing 𝑝𝐺 will, over
certain ranges, lead to an increase in the perceived volatility of the firm. On average, it appears that
the volatility effects are overwhelmed by the mean effects (for 𝑝𝐺 < 0.5). However, when split-
ting the unconditional expectation into two conditional components, this dichotomy is revealed.
When the manager does not receive a signal, the average conditional expected stock price is in-
creasing in 𝑝𝐺; when the manager receives a signal, the average conditional expected stock price
is 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 in 𝑝𝐺. Similarly, increasing the probability that the manager receives the signal
decreases the expected stock price, due to a worse perception of non-disclosure. Increasing the
number of uninformed investors leads to a small positive effect, driven by the larger information
asymmetry between uninformed investors and the manager when compared to informed investors
and the manager. Unsurprisingly, increasing the number of shares has a negative effect on the stock
price, as the number of shares only enters into the stock price in a negative manner (see Theorem
2). Lastly, the firm’s stock price decreases as the level of risk aversion among the investors rises,
since investors will need to be compensated more for the risk they take on by investing.
Regarding the effects of the model parameters on the manager’s disclosure choices, Figure
5 illustrates the effects on the cutoff between full disclosure and partial disclosure (𝑐𝐹𝐷), while
Figure 6 illustrates the effects on the cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding (𝑐𝑃𝐷).
Increasing the mean value of the good firm leads to higher levels for both cutoffs.9 This is due
to the wider spread between the good and bad firms. Increasing the standard deviation has the
opposite effect, leading the manager to disclose more fully and to lower both disclosure cutoffs.
While the remaining factors do not exhibit a clear pattern for the lower cutoff, the probability that
the manager receives a signal does appear to affect the cutoff between full and partial disclosure.
As the probability the manager receives a signal increases, the manager appears to disclose more
through the easy channel. The manager has an incentive to do this, as disclosing more makes
uninformed investors believe that a lack of disclosure will be more likely caused by the manager not
9This pattern also holds when examining the pattern between the cutoffs and a z-score, 𝜇𝐺/𝜎.
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receiving the signal. The cutoff between partial and full disclosure is unaffected, as the informed
investors will know whether or not the manager received a signal, regardless of the probability.
VI. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The primary model of this paper demonstrates a manager’s disclosure incentives when the
manager has two voluntary disclosure channels in the presence of both uninformed and informed
investors. The model follows a market for lemons structure in which the firm may be good or
bad, and the manager probabilistically receives a signal that is potentially useful in determining
the firm’s type, good or bad. If the manager receives a signal, the manager can choose to disclose
through an easy-to-process channel or a hard-to-process channel, or the manager can choose to
withhold the signal from investors. When there is sufficient difference between the firm types,
and when both informed and uninformed investors are present, the manager will adopt a three part
disclosure strategy. For high values of the signal, the manager will disclose the signal through the
easy-to-process channel. For low values of the signal, the manager will choose to not disclose,
withholding the information from the market. If the value of the signal is in the middle, the
manager will disclose through the hard-to-process channel.
This disclosure pattern is also consistent with maximizing the long-run stock price of the
firm. The derived rational expectations equilibrium shows that the manager’s optimal actions are
identical when maximizing the short-run and long-run stock prices. Furthermore, when the man-
ager has two disclosure channels available, the stock price will be higher initially after the man-
ager’s optimal action and will drop in the subsequent trading round, except for when the manager
disclosures in the easy-to-process channel. If the manager discloses in the easy-to-process channel,
then this information will be fully impounded in the stock price in the first round of trading. Taken
together, this indicates that, given any short run incentive to increase the stock price, the manager
in this setting can costlessly capture a gain through the use of multiple disclosure channels.
The model further demonstrates that, compared to when having only an easy-to-process
channel available, the manager will decrease disclosure to uninformed investors when given the
option of disclosing via an additional hard-to-process channel, though the manager will disclose
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more to the market overall. Such a model structure is akin to a pre-Reg FD setting where managers
could disclose privately, or to the present day setting where managers could intentionally place
certain voluntary disclosures in 10-K footnotes or other hard-to-process channels. The results of
this comparison could indicate a possible short-run inefficiency in the market while the uninformed
investors learn the information disclosed through the hard-to-process disclosure channel. From the
simulation, it appears that this short run effect could be priced, and would be driven by uninformed
investors valuing the firm at a higher price than they would if they had processed all available infor-
mation. However, the model also indicates that multiple channels of disclosure may serve to make
the market more efficient over longer periods of time, as the market should fully impound more
information than under a one disclosure channel system. As managers have the option to disclose
through multiple sources, it is an open empirical issue 1) if and how managers use these channels
in different ways and 2) if firms disclosing different information across disclosure channels leads
to an impact on the market.
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APPENDIX A
Variable definitions
𝑎 The coefficient of risk aversion for investors
𝑐𝐹𝐷 The signal cutoff between full disclosure and partial disclosure
𝑐′𝐹𝐷 The signal cutoff between full disclosure and withholding, 1 channel
𝑐𝑃𝐵 The signal cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding
𝐹𝐷 The full disclosure state
𝐼 Informed investors
𝑖 A subscript indicating an individual investor
𝐼𝑖 The information set of investor 𝑖
𝑁 The number of investors
𝑁𝐼 The number of informed investors
𝑁𝑈 The number of uninformed investors
𝑁𝐼 The no information state
𝑝 The probability the manager receives a signal
𝑃0,𝑠 The expected price of the stock under disclosure choice 𝑠
𝑃1 The price of the firm in period 1
𝑝𝐺 The unconditional probability the firm is good
𝑝𝑖,𝑠 The probability the firm is good, conditional on 𝐼𝑖 and 𝑠
𝑃𝐷 The partial disclosure state
𝑅𝑓 The risk-free rate
𝑠 A subscript indicating a state: 𝐹𝐷, 𝑃𝐷, 𝑊 , or 𝑁𝐼
𝑈 Uninformed investors
𝑊 The withholding state
𝑊0 Investor wealth at time 0
?˜?1,𝑖 The investor wealth process at time 1 for investor 𝑖
?¯? The number of shares available
𝑥𝑖,𝑠 The number of shares per investor demanded by investor 𝑖 in state 𝑠
𝑦 The random signal of firm value received by the manager
𝛽𝑥,𝑘
𝑥−𝜇𝑘
𝜎𝑘
𝜇𝐵 The unconditional expected value of a bad firm
𝜇𝐺 The unconditional expected value of a good firm
𝜎 The shared standard deviation of the good and bad firm’s payoffs
𝜎𝐵 The standard deviation of the bad firm’s payoff
𝜎𝐺 The standard deviation of the good firm’s payoff
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APPENDIX B
Existence of a non-degenerate equilibrium
Proof. For a non-degenerate equilibrium to exist, a higher value of the signal 𝑦 must indicate a
better firm while a lower value must indicate a worse firm. For such an equilibrium to exist, then,
there must exist some point 𝑦1 such that 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑊 for all 𝑦 > 𝑦1, and
some point 𝑦2 such that 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑊 for all 𝑦 < 𝑦2. These conditions imply
that investors would see the signal as good for values above 𝑦1 and bad for values below 𝑦2. These
conditions can be approached through a limit argument. As is shown below, the conditions on the
𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 do not constrain the solution space after constraining based on 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝑊 .
First, let 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 → ∞. Then 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 → 1, as, for all 𝛿 > 0,
lim𝑥→∞
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝑥)
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝑥)+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜑(𝑥−𝛿) = 1. Furthermore, 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 , 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷, and 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 will all approach 𝑝𝐺, the
unconditional probability that the firm is good, as, for all 𝛿 finite, lim𝑥→∞
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝑥)
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝑥)+(1−𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝑥−𝛿) =
𝑝𝐺. Let 𝑝′ = 2𝑝𝐺2 − 2𝑝𝐺 + 1. Substituting these probabilities into the time 0 price expressions
derived in Appendix C yields:
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 as 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 →∞,
⇒ 1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐺 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
>
𝑁𝐼𝜇𝐺 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1
]︁ ,
⇒ 𝜇𝐺
(︃
1− 𝑁𝐼 +
𝑝𝐺𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
)︃
>
𝑁𝑈
(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
+ 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
(︃
1
𝑁
− 1
𝑁𝐼 +
𝑁𝑈
𝑝′
)︃
,
⇒ 𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈
𝜇𝐺 >
𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈
𝜇𝐵 + 𝑎?¯?𝜎
2 𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝′)
𝑁(𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈)
,
⇒ 𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈
(𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵) > 𝑎?¯?𝜎22𝑁𝑈𝑝𝐺(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑁(𝑁𝐼𝑝′ + 𝑁𝑈)
,
⇒ 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑝𝐺𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2.
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑊 as 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 →∞,
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⇒ 1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐺 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
>
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1
]︁ ,
⇒ 𝜇𝐺 − 𝑎𝜎2 ?¯?
𝑁
> 𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎𝑝′𝜎2 ?¯?
𝑁
,
⇒ (1− 𝑝𝐺)(𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵) > 𝑎𝜎2 ?¯?
𝑁
(2𝑝𝐺(1− 𝑝𝐺)),
⇒ 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑝𝐺𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2.
Both conditions are identical, requiring that the difference between the mean of the distri-
bution for 𝑃1 for the good firm and bad firm be above a threshold of 2𝑝𝐺𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎
2. This condition
assures that a sufficiently high signal, 𝑦, is interpretted as an indicator of the company being good.
Next, let 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 → −∞. Under this limit, 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 → 0.
On the other hand, as the conditional probability of the manager having information given that
no disclosure took place approaches 0 in this case, uninformed investors will assume the manager
has no information if they do not observe a disclosure, and thus 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 → 𝑝𝐺. Let
𝑝′ = 2𝑝𝐺2 − 2𝑝𝐺 + 1. Substituting these probabilities into the time 0 price expressions derived in
Appendix C yields:
lim
𝑐→−∞
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 =
1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
,
lim
𝑐→−∞
𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 =
𝑁𝐼
𝜇𝐵
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′𝜎2 + 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑁𝐼
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
)︁ ,
lim
𝑐→−∞
𝑃0,𝑊 =
𝑁𝐼
𝜇𝐵
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′𝜎2 + 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑁𝐼
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
)︁ .
Note that the limits for 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃0,𝑊 are the same. Thus, if, in the limit, 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑊 , then
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷.
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 < 𝑃0,𝑊 as 𝑦, 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 → −∞,
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1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
]︁
<
𝑁𝐼
𝜇𝐵
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
𝑝′𝜎2 + 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
(︁
𝑁𝐼
𝜎2
+ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
)︁ ,
⇒ 𝑁𝑈
𝑝′𝜎2
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎?¯?
(︂
𝑁𝐼
𝑁
+
𝑁𝑈
𝑁𝑝′
)︂
<
𝑁𝑈𝑝𝐺
𝑝′𝜎2
𝜇𝐺 +
𝑁𝑈(1− 𝑝𝐺)
𝑝′𝜎2
𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎?¯?,
⇒ − 𝑁𝑈𝑝𝐺
𝑝′𝜎2
(𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵) < 𝑎?¯? 𝑁𝑈
𝑁𝑝′
(1− 𝑝′).
Since 𝜇𝐺 > 𝜇𝐵 by definition and since the support of 𝑝′ is (0.5, 1) (as 𝑝 ∈ (0, 1)), the statement
holds for all parameter values.
Taking the two sets of limits together, so long as 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑝𝐺𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2, a non-degenerate
solution exists.
APPENDIX C
Derivation
This section derives 𝑃0 under each of the four states: full disclosure, partial disclosure,
withholding, and no information.
First, the probabilities in Lemma 1 must be derived. Per Bayes’ theorem, P (𝐴|𝐵) =
P(𝐴)P(𝐵|𝐴)
P(𝐵) , and P (𝐵) = P (𝐴)P (𝐵|𝐴) + P
(︀
𝐴{
)︀
P
(︀
𝐵|𝐴{)︀.
Furthermore, note that under full disclosure, both investor types know 𝑦. Under partial
disclosure, the informed investors will likewise know 𝑦, but uninformed investors will not. Under
withholding, informed investors know that 𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷, where 𝑐𝑃𝐷 is an endogenously determined
cutoff. Under no information, informed investors are aware that the manager did not receive a
signal, and thus have no information to condition on. For uninformed investors, they cannot distin-
guish between the partial disclosure, withholding, and no information states. As such, they must
endogenously determine probabilities based on a cutoff 𝑐𝐹𝐷 below which full disclosure will not
occur. Thus, for investor 𝑖 and state 𝑠, the conditional probability that the firm is good conditioned
on the given information can be defined as 𝑝𝑖,𝑠. Let 𝛽𝑥,𝑇 = 𝑥−𝜇𝑇𝜎 , 𝜑(𝑥) be the normal distribution
PDF, and Φ(𝑥) be the normal distribution CDF.
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1. Since informed investors know the manager didn’t receive the signal under the no informa-
tion state, it is easy to see that 𝑝𝐼,𝑁𝐼 = 𝑝𝐺, as this is the unconditional probability that the
firm is good.
2. Let firm type be 𝑇 , good or bad. P (𝑦 < 𝑐|𝑇 ) = Φ (︀ 𝑐−𝜇𝑇
𝜎
)︀
= Φ (𝛽𝑐,𝑇 ). Thus, 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 =
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐺)+(1−𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝑃𝐷,𝐵)
.
3. Likewise, P (𝑦 < 𝑐 or @𝑦|𝑇 ) = 𝑝Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺) + (1 − 𝑝). Thus, 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑁𝐼 =
𝑝𝐺(𝑝Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺)+(1−𝑝))
𝑝(𝑝𝐺Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐺)+(1−𝑝𝐺)Φ(𝛽𝑐𝐹𝐷,𝐵))+(1−𝑝)
.
4. When a specific 𝑦 is known, the functional form of the probability is similar, but based on
the PDF instead of the CDF, since an individual value is known. Thus, 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 = 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 =
𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 =
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺)
𝑝𝐺𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐺)+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜑(𝛽𝑦,𝐵) .
Thus, the derivation of Lemma 1 is complete. Next, using equation (2) the price can be derived
under a general state. From (2),
𝑥𝑖,𝑠 =
E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁
−𝑅𝑓𝑃0
𝑎V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁ .
Aggregating 𝑥𝑖,𝑠 up to ?¯?:
?¯? = 𝑁𝐼𝑥𝐼,𝑠 + 𝑁𝑈𝑥𝑈,𝑠.
Solving the above for 𝑃0,𝑠 yields:
𝑃0,𝑠 =
𝑁𝐼
E[𝑃1|𝐼𝐼,𝑠]
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝐼,𝑠]
+ 𝑁𝑈
E[𝑃1|𝐼𝑈,𝑠]
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝑈,𝑠]
− 𝑎?¯?
𝑅𝑓
[︂
𝑁𝐼
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝐼,𝑠]
+ 𝑁𝑈
V[𝑃1|𝐼𝑈,𝑠]
]︂ .
Next, this expression can be explicitly derived for each of the four states. Note that E
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁
=
𝑝𝑖,𝑠𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝑖,𝑠)𝜇𝐵 and V
[︁
𝑃1|𝐼𝑖,𝑠
]︁
= 𝑝𝑖,𝑠
2𝜎2 + (1− 𝑝𝑖,𝑠)2𝜎2 = (2𝑝𝑖,𝑠2− 2𝑝𝑖,𝑠 + 1)𝜎2. Thus, the
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price at time 0 can explicitly be written, under each of the four states, as:
𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 =
1
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷𝜇𝐺 + (1− 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷)𝜇𝐵 − 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
(2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷
2 − 2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 + 1)𝜎2
]︁
,
𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷2−2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝑈,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷2−2𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1
]︁ ,
𝑃0,𝑊 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐼,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐼,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐼,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑊+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝑈,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐼,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝐼,𝑊+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1
]︁ ,
𝑃0,𝑁𝐼 =
𝑁𝐼
𝑝𝐺𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝐺)𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 + 𝑁𝑈
𝑝𝑈,𝑊𝜇𝐺+(1−𝑝𝑈,𝑊 )𝜇𝐵
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1 − 𝑎?¯?𝜎2
𝑅𝑓
[︁
𝑁𝐼
2𝑝𝐺2−2𝑝𝐺+1 +
𝑁𝑈
2𝑝𝑈,𝑊 2−2𝑝𝑈,𝑊+1
]︁ .
APPENDIX D
Disclosure patterns
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 1, as the two disclosure cutoffs and 𝑦 approach infinity, full
disclosure will have a higher price than partial disclosure and withholding when the existence con-
dition is met. Thus, full disclosure will be used for at least all 𝑦 above some point 𝑦. Furthermore,
from the proof of Theorem 1, as the two disclosure cutoffs and 𝑦 approach negative infinity, full
disclosure will have a lower price than partial disclosure and withholding. Thus, full disclosure
will not be the only strategy employed.
By the above argument, it is known that 𝑐𝐹𝐷 exists. At 𝑦 = 𝑐𝐹𝐷, it must be that 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 =
𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷, as the informed investors have the exact same information sets under full and partial dis-
closure. However, as everything but the probabilities is constant with respect to 𝑦 and 𝑐𝐹𝐷 in the
equation for the price 𝑃0, this implies that 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝐹𝐷 at 𝑦 = 𝑐𝐹𝐷 as well.
To prove existence of 𝑐𝑃𝐷, note that since 𝑝𝐼,𝑊 and 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 are fixed and positive
given any specified 𝑐𝐹𝐷 and 𝑐𝑃𝐷, then 𝑃0 under withholding is fixed. Also note that 𝑃0, as a
function, is always positive. Since 𝑝𝑈,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑝𝑈,𝑊 , then for 𝑐𝑃𝐷 to exist, there must be some value
of 𝑐𝑃𝐷 such that at 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷, 𝑃0 is equal under both withholding and partial disclosure.
First, note that the value of 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 does not depend on 𝑐𝑃𝐷 or 𝑐𝐹𝐷. Further note that, from
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Appendix B, 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 limits to 1 as 𝑦 limits to infinity, and 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 limits to 0 as 𝑦 limits to negative
infinity. Also, note that 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷, as fa function, is comprised of three terms, each term relating
to 𝜑(·), the PDF of the standard normal distribution. This function is continuous, mapping 𝜑 :
(−∞,∞) → (0, 1/√2𝜋). Since the numerator of 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 is 𝜑 times a constant, and the denominator
of 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 is a weighted sum of 𝑝ℎ𝑖 functions (with positive weights), then both the numerator and
denominator are continuous functions mapping to positive real numbers, and thus the function
𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 itself is continuous.
Since 𝑝𝐼,𝑃𝐷 is continuous and approaches both 0 and 1, and since 𝑝𝑊 is a constant value
between 0 and 1, then by the Intermediate Value Theorem, these two functions must cross for some
value of 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷. Thus, 𝑐𝑃𝐷 must exist.
Furthermore, note that at 𝑐𝐹𝐷, 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃0,𝐹𝐷 > 𝑃0,𝑊 . Consequently, the manager will
prefer partial disclosure when 𝑐𝑃𝐷 < 𝑦 < 𝑐𝐹𝐷.
To show that below 𝑐𝑃𝐷 the manager will prefer withholding relies on showing that the
derivative of 𝑃0,𝑃𝐷 at 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷 is positive. However, determining the sign of the derivative analyti-
cally is seemingly intractible. Simulating the derivative (following the methodology in Section V)
finds that the derivative is positive in every single iteration. A positive derivative here indicates that
for 𝑦 below 𝑐𝑃𝐷 the manager would prefer withholding, and for 𝑦 above 𝑐𝑃𝐷 the manager would
prefer partial disclosure (up to 𝑐𝐹𝐷).
Thus, all three disclosure options will be used in the manager’s optimal disclosure strategy:
withholding for low values of 𝑦, partial disclosure for middle values, and full disclosure for high
values.10
APPENDIX E
Fully revealing equilibrium
Proof. Let 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2 and consider the sign of 𝜕𝑃0𝜕𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 under state 𝐹𝐷:
10Note that while this proof shows that the manager will have 2 cutoff points, it does not preclude the manager
from having cutoff points other than the 2 mentioned. Thus, it does not constitute a proof of uniqueness. Such a
proof would need to show that no cutoff point can exist when the probability that the firm is good from the investors’
perspective changes based on the manager’s disclosure choice. This is discussed in the simulation in Section V.
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𝜕𝑃0
𝜕𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝐹𝐷
=
1
𝑅𝑓
(︁
(𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵)− 𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
(4𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 − 2)𝜎2
)︁
> 0
⇒ 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 < 1
2
(︂
1 +
𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵
2𝑎 ?¯?
𝑁
𝜎2
)︂
> 1
Since 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 < 1 by definition, 𝑃0 under state FD is monotonic in 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷. Since 𝑝𝐼,𝐹𝐷 is
monotonic in 𝑦, 𝑃0 is monotonic in 𝑦 when 𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2.
Showing that 𝑃0 under state 𝑃𝐷 is monotonic in 𝑦 is significantly more difficult analyti-
cally. As such, this is instead demonstrated in the simulation in Section V. In all iterations when
𝜇𝐺 − 𝜇𝐵 > 2𝑎 ?¯?𝑁 𝜎2, 𝑃0|𝑃𝐷 is monotonic in 𝑦.
Thus, 𝑃0 appears to be monotonic in all situations when there is a signal and it is dis-
closed. Furthermore, when there is a signal and it is not disclosed, the expected value is identical
to the price when a signal equal to 𝑐𝑃𝐷 is disclosed. Consequently, 𝑃0 is invertible over the set
(𝑐𝑃𝐷,∞)∖{𝑃0−1(𝑃0|𝑁𝐼)}. Thus, 𝑃0 is invertible for all but two prices: the price when no in-
formation exists and the highest price at which information is withheld. When information is
withheld, however, the price is identical to 𝑃0(𝑐𝑃𝐷). As withholding occurs with finite probability,
P (𝑦 < 𝑐𝑃𝐷) ·𝑝, whereas 𝑦 = 𝑐𝑃𝐷 occurs with probability approximately 0, investors can infer that
if the price is initially 𝑃0(𝑐𝑃𝐷), the manager chose to withhold information. When no information
exists, the price will initially be at some value 𝑃 *0 . As no signal existing occurs with finite proba-
bility 𝑝, whereas, 𝑦 = 𝑃−10 (𝑃
*
0 ) occurs with probability approximately 0, investors can infer that
if 𝑃0 equals 𝑃 *0 , no signal exists. Thus, investors can determine the available information at ev-
ery possible price, and consequently a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium will attain.
Furthermore, since the price is invertible, the solution must be unique.
34
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225226 
Figures
Figure 1: Diagram of the full model
Firm
Manager
Easy Channel Hard Channel
Uninformed Investors Informed Investors
A diagram of the flow of information in the market. Solid lines represent information transfers, dashed lines represent partial information transfers, and
dotted lines represent information transfers that only occur in the long run.
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Figure 2: Optimizing disclosure
Panel A: Full disclosure vs partial disclosure
Panel B: Partial disclosure vs withholding
These two graphs illustrate the process for choosing the optimal disclosure cutoff points from the manager’s
perspective. The graphs are based on the numerical example parameters listed in Table 1. Parameter definitions are
included in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Optimal disclosure
Panel A: Stock price as a function of disclosure choice
Panel B: Pricing as a function of the signal, 𝑦
These graphs show the stock price at time 0, 𝑃0, as a function of the signal the manager receives (if received)
and the manager’s disclosure choice. Panel A shows the payoffs for all disclosure choices, whereas Panel B shows the
price as a function of the manager’s optimal choices. These graphs are based on the numerical example parameters
listed in Table 1. Parameter definitions are included in Appendix A.
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Figure 4: Unconditional expected price statics
Mean value, 𝜇𝐺 Standard deviation, 𝜎 Good probability, 𝑝𝐺
0.618, 𝑝 < 0.001 −0.852, 𝑝 < 0.001 0.795, 𝑝 < 0.001
Signal probability, 𝑝 Uninformed investors, 𝑁𝑈 Number of shares, ?¯?
−0.930, 𝑝 < 0.001 0.0005, 𝑝 = 0.003 −0.0025, 𝑝 < 0.001
Risk aversion, 𝑎
−0.315, 𝑝 < 0.001
These smoothed density histograms show the relationship between the unconditional expected stock price at
time 0 (𝑃0) on the vertical axes and various parameters of the model on the horizontal axes. These plots are based
on a simulation of 10,000 iterations of the model (see Table 1 for specific details). Lighter colors represent a greater
concentration of values near the specific parameter-price pairing, and the enclosed regions represent level curves of
the density at 10% intervals. Significant trends based on OLS regressions are noted above the graphs; graphs with no
significant trends at the 𝑝 < 0.05 level are instead marked as n.s. Parameter definitions are included in Appendix A.
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Figure 5: Disclosure statics, cutoff between full disclosure and partial disclosure (𝑐𝐹𝐷)
Mean value, 𝜇𝐺 Standard deviation, 𝜎 Good probability, 𝑝𝐺
0.519, 𝑝 < 0.001 −0.214, 𝑝 < 0.001 n.s.
Signal probability, 𝑝 Uninformed investors, 𝑁𝑈 Number of shares, ?¯?
−0.306, 𝑝 < 0.001 n.s. n.s.
Risk aversion, 𝑎
n.s.
These smoothed density histograms show the relationship between the disclosure cutoff between full disclosure
and partial disclosure on the vertical axes and various parameters of the model on the horizontal axes. These plots
are based on a simulation of 10,000 iterations of the model (see Table 1 for specific details). Lighter colors represent
a greater concentration of values near the specific parameter-disclosure cutoff, and the enclosed regions represent
level curves of the density at 10% intervals. Significant trends based on OLS regressions are noted above the graphs;
graphs with no significant trends at the 𝑝 < 0.05 level are instead marked as n.s. Parameter definitions are included in
Appendix A.
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Figure 6: Disclosure statics, cutoff between partial disclosure and withholding (𝑐𝑃𝐷)
Mean value, 𝜇𝐺 Standard deviation, 𝜎 Good probability, 𝑝𝐺
0.473, 𝑝 < 0.001 −0.585, 𝑝 < 0.001 n.s.
Signal probability, 𝑝 Uninformed investors, 𝑁𝑈 Number of shares, ?¯?
n.s. n.s. n.s.
Risk aversion, 𝑎
n.s.
These smoothed density histograms show the relationship between the disclosure cutoff between partial disclo-
sure and withholding on the vertical axes and various parameters of the model on the horizontal axes. These plots
are based on a simulation of 10,000 iterations of the model (see Table 1 for specific details). Lighter colors repre-
sent a greater concentration of values near the specific parameter-disclosure cutoff, and the enclosed regions represent
level curves of the density at 10% intervals. Significant trends based on OLS regressions are noted above the graphs;
graphs with no significant trends at the 𝑝 < 0.05 level are instead marked as n.s. Parameter definitions are included in
Appendix A.
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Tables
Table 1: Parameters for numerical example and simulation
Parameter Example value Simulation distribution
𝜇𝐺 2 Uniform[1, 3]
𝜇𝐵 0 0
𝜎 1 Uniform[0.5, 1]
𝑝𝐺 0.5 Uniform[0, 0.5]
𝑝 0.5 Uniform[0, 1]
𝑅𝑓 1 1
𝑁 100 100
𝑁𝑈 50 ⌊Uniform[1, 100]⌋
𝑁𝐼 50 𝑁 −𝑁𝑈
?¯? 100 ⌊Uniform[50, 101]⌋
𝑎 1 Uniform[0, 1]
This table shows the distributions for each parameter in the simulation. The parameter choices are chosen such
that 2𝑝𝐺𝜎2 ?¯?𝑁 < 1 and 𝜇𝐺−𝜇𝐵 > 1, thus fulfilling the condition of Theorem 1, ensuring existence of a non-degenerate
competitive equilibrium for any choices of parameter values. Parameter definitions are included in Appendix A.
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